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Alex Weisiger’s Logics of War observes that most wars last a few months and kill 
thousands while a few others last years and kill hundreds of thousands or even millions. Weisiger 
then, in a well written and well organized text, offers an explanation of why this is so: short wars 
are usually driven by mutual optimism or domestic politics while long wars are caused by 
commitment problems. Suggesting that commitment problems are a root cause of long, severe 
wars is not new (Powell 2006; 2012; Reiter 2009). Weisiger, however, expands on existing 
rationalist arguments about war termination by sorting out the effects of commitment problems 
caused by power shifts from those caused by a leader’s perceived aggressive disposition. He also 
provides compelling quantitative evidence—something lacking in previous research on 
commitment problems. Finally, the work’s theory is ably illustrated in cases on World War Two 
and the Paraguayan War as well as in shorter cases on the Crimean, Pacific, Iran-Iraq, Falklands, 
Franco-Turkish, and Anglo-Persian Wars. 
The book’s argument begins with the insight that in order for a war to end, the causes of 
that war must be removed (Blainey, 1988). Like Reiter (2009), Weisiger contends that private 
information held antebellum is revealed swiftly by battles provided the war is intensely fought. 
This means mutual optimism cannot cause long, intense conflicts as states’ expectations 
converge quickly as battles are fought. Weisiger concedes that wars in which there is little 
combat in any given period—for example guerilla conflicts—reveal information slowly and thus 
can drag on much longer without expectations converging. Still, most informational wars should 
be short, meaning long, severe wars cannot rationally be explained by mutual optimism. 
Additionally, Weisiger argues regimes waging diversionary wars can only delude their publics 
for so long, meaning lengthy wars which are fought for rational reasons must be the result of 
commitment problems. 
The book proceeds to neatly sort out the implications of two distinct types of 
commitment problems: preventive wars fought over concerns about future power shifts and wars 
fought because one of the belligerent states is dispositionally unable to credibly commit to peace. 
Weisiger argues that wars fought over power shifts are likely to be long and severe as a state’s 
ability to demand future concessions after becoming more powerful can only be eliminated by 
greatly weakening that state now or significantly reducing its potential for growth. Obviously, 
this is difficult to do quickly and requires a great amount of devastation. Alternatively, such wars 
could end if the rising power is able to impose the feared future concessions on its opponent in 
the present, obviating the need for future conflict. Again, this is likely to take time. Dispositional 
commitment problems, however, should lead to even more severe and drawn out conflicts as 
introducing regime change as a non-negotiable war aim forces a fight to the finish. Importantly, 
the work also explains where such dispositional commitment problems come from. They arise 
when the target of a preventive war had no intention of using the coming power shift in the 
manner which the aggressor feared. This in turn induces the target to conceive of its opponent as 
irrevocably aggressive as it cannot fathom its opponent’s true motives. 
Another major contribution is the use of statistics to test the above arguments. Previous 
commitment problem research avoided large-n studies in part because no direct, quantifiable 
measure of commitment problems exists. Weisiger overcomes this by using shifts in relative 
material capabilities during the antebellum period as a proxy for fear of decline and hence 
commitment problems. He also uses battle deaths in relation to states’ populations and 
capabilities as a proxy for war severity and revealed information. Employing a series of 
competing risks regressions he finds that antebellum power shifts do indeed lead to longer wars, 
while intense fighting leads to shorter wars. Additional regressions indicate the finding on 
intensity is not driven by military collapse. Thus, it is the information revealed by combat which 
leads to converging expectations and settlement and not total defeat which leads quicker war 
termination. The statistics include a series of robustness checks on model forms and include 
controls for military strategy, regime type, relative capabilities, terrain, and population. When 
combined the statistics, robust case studies, and careful theorizing make a convincing case for 
the importance of commitment problems in explaining war duration and severity. 
 The book, however, is not without some weaknesses. First, while the book reasonably 
argues—and defends with evidence from the Falklands and Franco-Turkish Wars—that intense 
wars fought against the will of a state’s selectorate will be relatively short as it becomes 
impossible over time for the regime to hide mounting costs and battlefield failures from its own 
people, it is less clear why a regime with a small selectorate could not continue a war which 
produced private goods for a majority of the selectorate even while harming the broader society. 
In other words, while convincing that intense wars fought for private gains or diversionary 
purposes will be short given a reasonably large selectorate, it is unclear that there are not some 
situations where the selectorate is small enough that a winning coalition could be bought off with 
private goods. In such cases, it should be possible to wage long, intense wars that do not benefit 
the broader populace. Of course, such scenarios are probably rare meaning the book is right that 
there are few long wars driven by domestic politics mechanisms. 
Second, the book has some difficulty explaining the end of the Iran-Iraq War. While the 
book convincingly argues that dispositional commitment problems posed by Saddam Hussein 
were responsible for the Iran-Iraq War being as lengthy and severe as it was, the war ultimately 
ended in a negotiated settlement without Saddam being removed from power. While Weisiger 
reasonably contends the Iranians concluded the additional fighting required to remove Saddam 
would be too costly, why it took them so long to realize this is unclear. Also, this explanation 
means commitment problems provide limited leverage in explaining the war’s termination. How 
common such negotiated endings are in wars driven by commitment problems is unknown and 
the puzzle presented by it raises important questions for future research. It does not, however, 
take away from the book’s overall contribution to the war duration and rationalist literatures nor 
weaken the argument that commitment problems are causal of long, severe wars. 
In sum, the work is a compelling explanation of war severity and especially in relation to 
war duration. It is characterized by clear argumentation and provides ample quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. It will be of interest to students of war generally and specifically to those 
interested in rationalist explanations or in the linkages between war initiation and termination. 
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